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ALLIED STRATEGY
By KLAUS MEHNERT
The comparative calm un tlUJ battle from.. during Ih; '-t. few mo,UM haM been
employed by all the beUigererll" for military pnparaJioM on a wide «ale. probablll
10 on ene,Ll unporoUcl«l in the ItiMory of ma"l-ind. A PlelD plwH lin Ill.. gigoflJic
war i. approa~IIiPlg. lVe take tlti" opportunity to publu/a four ortidu ill t1Ii,f ;-e
whil'h. Uit! trlUlt. will aid our rroderll ill apprccwtillu the ••"PlijiCO'IU of thill momnal
tJlld tllc Cl1CtIJd IOIlil'h are aOOId to uPlfold.
7'hc fir..t of thue article. lhal. with tlte 6trougy of the Allie8. Their unlra'
problcm i8 tehffe to apply lAe main pru.ure of lAeir armed foru8-agai1Ul4 Europe
or a9Oil181 Ea8t A8m. Hence the 6logalUl of "Europe Fir"" and "Japan Fir"" are
mnolllJ the 1IIoel popu",r polUicttl lerme of the pruent I~tne.
In thill articlc-Ihe firlll of illl kind. we beU_we ha.l'C trac~ llac I14cwy of
lit... paramou,ll IlIrategical probl.,n and iU prodical applicat·ion. by colkcti"9 and
OIlalyriPlg "'Itch IlcalluM material 0'1 battlc". epeechu. co,tfermcclI. and imp0rt4n1
appointmcnu.
No.
BEFORE Al'iD AFTER DECEMBER 8
Whatever the leading men in London
and Washington may have thought in
fonner years about the order in which
they hoped to destroy Germany and
Japan-the moment the war actuaUy
started in Europe, in September 1939,
without involving Japan, they adopted a
"Europe First" policy. There W88 no
difficulty in agreeing on this !UI long 88
the war W88 confined to Europe. But 88
800n as war broke out in the Pacific on
December 8, 1941, a serious strategical
prublem aroee. In the first few weeks it
did not yet become acute. The American
and British f01'OO8 stationed in E88t Asia
were forced to fight back wherever they
happened to be, trying to hold what they
could. But soon the extraordinary Japa-
nese successes made it quite clear that it
was only a question of time before the
for.oee th9 Anglo-Saxon powers had in
East Asia would be overwhelmed.
The Allies. not strong enough to fight
a larp-ecale war simultaneously against
two continentAl, had sooner or later to
decide: should aU available Anglo-
American foret'8 be dispatched to East
Asia to stem the Japanese advance, to
attempt a reconquest of the areas lost
there, and to attack Ja.pan; or should
the combined weight of the British and
American forces be thrown against Europe
in the hope of crwiliing Germany and
Italy, with the intention of turning
against Japan only after the accomplish-
ment of this aim ?
In speaking of these two alternatives, we
do not mean to imply that the choice of
one excluded aU fighting whatsoever in
the other. There had to be a certain
amount of fighting both in the European
and the Pacifio war theaters at the same
time, no matter what the decision. PM
choiu wtU. not ~here to figltt and WMre
not to fight, but where to concentrate tM
bulk oj tAe available Jorcu Jor Iarge-8CCJk
actio"".
From the outset there was the possi-
bility of a conflict between London and
Washington. For London there was no
question but that the "Europe First"
policy must be adhered to even after
Deoember 8. To concentrate the Allied
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forces in the Pacific meant to the British
leaders the inviting of disaster to the
British position in Europe and Africa.
London felt that it could survive the 1088
of everything except the British Isles,
Gibraltar, and the Suez Canal.
. For Washington the situation was dif-
ferent. Although, particularly since the
A n8C1UfJ,88 of Austria to Germany in the
spring of 1938, the American people had
been fed anti-Hitler propaganda in large
quantities, the feeling of the Americans
808 a whole was more anti-Japanese
than anti-German. America had no pos-
seBBions in Europe. But in the Pacific
she stood to lose, not only the Philippines
and her other island possessions such as
Guam, Hawaii, and Samoa, perhaps evell
the Aleutians, but also her advantageous
position in China. Finally, there was
the memory of the Pearl Harbor di5aster,
which inclined the Americans to consider
Japan as their Enemy No. l. (The re-
sults of a. Gallup poll published on Feb-
ruary 24, 1943, showed that 50 per cent
of all Americans voted Japan as "Ameri-
ca's Enemy No. I," and 34 per cent
Germany.)
THE FIB8T W~HINGTON MEETING
Winston Churchill was probably among
the first to realize the danger that might
arise from this difference of opinion in
the Allied camp. We believe that his
decision to fly to Washington less than a
fortnight after the start of the Pacific
war and to spend a fortnight in America
was prompted largely by his desire to use
all his personal influence to win over
Roosevelt to the oontinuation of the
"Europe First" policy in spite of what
was going on in the Pacifio.
During Churchill's stay in America, a
Supreme Command for the southwestern
Pacifio was agreed. upon in Washington
on January 3, 1942, and Sir Archibald
Wavell, Commander in Chief of the
British forces in India, was appointed
its head. This move allayed some of the
fears felt in Malaya and the Philippines,
in the Dutch East Indies and Burma, in
Chungking and Australia, of being left to
their own devices. But looking back on
the events between the appointment of
Wavell and the conclusion of the Japanese
conquest of Burma, we know that this
was only an empty gesture. The SUCOO88
of Churchill's "Europe First" policy was
complete. The southwestern Pacific had
been abandoned to its fate. "If we have
not got la.rge forces in Burma and clse-
where in the Far East, it is I who am
responsible," Churchill frankly stated in
the House of Commons on January 27
after his return from Washington.
At the time, few people realized that
the First Waahington Meeting-as we
shall call this fIrst conference between
Churchill and Roosevelt after December
8-had resulted in a "Europe First"
decision. Churchill was careful enough
not to broadcast this fact, knowing what
effect it would have on the morale of the
armies and nations in the southwestern
Pacific. It was Colonel Frank Knox,
American Secretary of the Navy, who let
the cat out of the bag with one of his
frequent careleBB remarks when, in ,Jan-
uary 1942, he declared tha.t the policy of
the Allies was to "beat Hitler first."
His statement immediately provoked a
violent reaction, chieft.y in Australia and
Chungking but also in America. From
this moment on, the controverny of
"Hitler Firat" versus "Japlul First" haa
not ceased to agitate the minds of the
Allied camp.
PUBLIC OPINION
The geographical division between the
adherents of these two slogans is relatively
clear. The British Isles and the Ameri-
can East Coast are for "Europe First,"
while Chungking, Australia, and the other
Anglo·American possessions in the Pacifio,
as well as the American West Coaat, are
for "Japan First." The Soviet Union
naturally belongs to the "EuroPe First"
camp, and its unceasing public pleas for
a second front have all been directen
toward the establishment of this second
front in Europe. There can be no deubt
that Molotov, during his visit to Lendon
and Washington in May and June, .. well
88 Stalin, during Churchill'sviait to
Moscow in August 1942, both stressed the
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nrgency of a "Europe First" strategy.
Least unified iii public opinion in the
United States. The majority of the press,
under the influence of Roosevelt's political
machint' and the Jews, who are of CoUt'8e
all for "Hitler First," advocate Chur-
chill's policy. Yet there are also op-
ponents of this policy, among them
Senator Albert B. "Happy" Chandler
from Kentucky, Senator Burton K.
Wheeler from Montana, and the news-
papers belonging to the Hearst concern.
They all warn America not to fall for
Churchill's bait and fight England's war
in Europe, but rather to look after
America's own interests which are
menaced in the Pacific.
From time to time, events have taken
place which, greatly to the relief of
Australia and Chungking, seemed to
indicate, a shift in the Allied strategy
toward "Pacific First." But they were
innriably followed by disappointment.
April 18, 1942, saw the American air
raid on Japan. Nobody imagined at the
time that it was the foolhardy stunt
which it later turned out to be. On the
contrary, many people took it as evidence
that the Allies had- started a real war
apiDst Japan. The fallacy of thiB as-
......0Il, however, became apparent
..hen wNb:&Dd months paued without
a repet#iQ1l of the raid. The Secoild
WuhfDgton Meeting for whioh Churohjll
came to America from June 19 to 24,
) 942, revealed that there had been no
change in the "Europe First" strategy,
although it was temporarily replaced by
"Africa First."
AFRICA FIRST
In his pl'e88 conference of November
11, 1942, in the first triumph over the
suocessfullanding in North Africa, Pres-
ident Roosevelt revealed the following
interesting facts. During the First
Wasbington Meeting, he and Churchill
had agreed on a frontal attack against
Europe acrOM the Channel. But the
more the plan was studied the greater
appeared the difficulties for its realization
in 1942. It was then decided-according
to the President, in June 1942-to sub-
stitute it by an invasion of North Africa.
Apparently the Allied leaders felt that
they had to force the Axis out of Africa
in order to remove the threat to Egypt
and to reopen their Mediterranean life
line before they could undertake any
move against Europe. Perhaps they also
hoped that Stalin might accept their
landing in Africa as a substitute second
front. This, it turned out later, was not
the case, for Moscow's clamor for a
second front was not lessened by the
events in North Africa. At any rate,
the African venture postponed the neces-
sity of attacking Europe itself.
While everything was done after that
to prepare the landings in the French
colonial empire, Borne naval "engagements
took place in the Pacific (First and
Second Solomon Battles, Battle of the
South Pacific, Third Solomon Battle), all
resulting in huge losses for the American
fleet. At that time Roosevelt also made
some statements which could have been
interpreted as indicating his change-over
to a "Pacific First" policy. While raising
futile hopes in Australia and Chungking,
they probably had no other purpose than
to divert the attention of the Axis from
North Africa.
CASABLANOA
From the moment the Allied invasion
of Frenoh North Africa began on the
night of "November 7, 1942, it became
obvious that for a long time to come
there would be no chance for "Pacific
First." The Casablanca Conference,
which lasted from January 14 to 26, 1943,
emphasized this fact. Roosevelt and
Churchill were careful enough not to
include any direct statement referring to
their "Europe First" policy in the com-
munique of January 27. Indirectly, how-
ever, they made it quite clear when they
said: "our [Roosevelt's and Churchill's]
main objective is to relieve the burden
on the Soviet armies as much as possible."
If this was their main objective, it could
only be attained by throwing all available
forces against Europe.
A1J a result, they continued to strength-
en their North Africa armies until these.
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amounted to about one million men
with V&8t equipment. In the Pacifio,
however, after three more battles in the
Solomons area (off Lunga on Guadaloanar
leland, off Rennell leland, and off Isabel
Islands), all of whioh entailed great 1088e8
for the US Navy, the naval war lost in
size and importlinoe; while the land war
(on GuadaJoanar, in New Guinea, along
the Ara.kan O0&8t in Burm"', and on Attu
Island), although strategically important,
never assumed the proportions of the first
few months after December 8.
In his amazing broadc&8t of March 21,
1943, Churchill stressed the "Hitler First"
policy more sharply than ever before and
went so far as to say that, after the end
of the war in Europe, Great Britain would
demobilize part of her forces because
there were many British soldiers who,
for physical re&8ons, could not be em-
ployed in the war theater against Japan
with its vast distances and poor lines of
communication. Thus Churchill practi-
cally -stated that England's interest in a
full-scale war terminated with the res-
toration of peace in Europe, leaving the
burden of the war against Japan to the
Americans. The Prime Minister made no
mention whatever of Chungking. This
speech naturally created a disastrous
impression among the Allied partners in
Asia and the southwestern Pacific, the
more so as Cordell Hull, the American
Secretary of State, declared his full agree-
ment with Churchill two days later.
Indeed, the impression created by the
broadC&8t W&8 so alarming that Anthony
Eden, the British Minister for Foreign
Mairs, who happened to be visiting the
USA at the time, attempted in a speech
in Annapolis on March 26, 1943, to allay
some of the alarm.
TIm TIIIRD WA8BDfOTON JlEETJNO
From May II to 27, 1943, the Third,
and 80 far last, Washington Meeting
between Churchill and Roosevelt took
place. It brought the number of days
which Churchill spent with Roosevelt
since the start of the Pacific war up to 47
(Finrt Wuhington Meeting 14 days,
8eoond Washington Meeting 7 days,
C&8ablanca 10 days, Third Wuhington
Meeting 16 days). Once again the ques-
tion of "Europe First" W&8 among the
chief topics of their conversation. Watch-
ing its sons fall on the battlefields of
North Africa, sensing the approaCh of an
invasion attempt against Europe with
the terrific 10000s it would ent,ail, and
feeling that the advantages which Ameri-
ca could derive for henelf from the
establishment of a second front in Europe
were most doubtful, the American nation
became more and more openly skeptical
of the wisdom of the "Europe Fint"
polioy. Roosevelt had to take this
American sentiment into consideration.
Hence he refrained from any statement on
future policy in that by now famous one-
sentence communique of May 28 whir:h
read: "The reCf'nt conference of the
combined staffs in Washington haa ended
in complete agreement on future opera-
tions on every front."
"That's all I have for you. bOYfl."
Stephen Early, President Roosevelt's sec-
retary, is reported to have said apologet-
ically to the disappointed journalists
after reading the communiqu~ at an
evening press co~eren~ in the White
Ho~.
The strategic result of the Third
W&8hington Meeting has been kept a
carefully guarded secret. One might even
say that everything was done to confuse
the world about the real outcome of the
conference. Churchill himself made con-
tradictory statements. On the one hand
he declared in a prea conference at the
White House that the war would be
waged "with the same vigor on both
fronts"; on the other hand, in his speech
before the US Congresa on May 19, he
emphasized the urgency of aiding the
USSR, dampened the hopes for an attack
against Burma, and promised England's
support of the USA against Japan only
"when the time is ripe."
On the whole, commentators were
inclined to agree that once more Churchill'8
"Europe First.. had triumphed. The
near future will probably 8how whether
they were correct in this. A serious
attempt to invade Europe would auto-
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matioally relegate the Pacific war theater
to second place, although it might allow
the sending of planes to Australia and
Chungking and the carrying out of some
"publicity offensives" in the Pacific.
THE MATTER OF COMMA...>IT>
Strategic decisions are very closely
linked with appointment.~ to important
military commands. In this respect the
picture offered by the war against Europe
is far clearer than that in the Pacific.
Outside of the British Isles, the Allied
armies are concentrated in two areas:
North Africa and the Near East. The
armies in North Africa have as their
COmmander in Chief General Dwight
Eisenhower (American), those in the
Near East General Sir Henry Maitland
Wilson (British). The naval commanders
in these areas are Admiral Sir Andrew
Brown Cunningham, in charge of naval
operations in the Mediterranean, and his
cousin, Admiral Sir John RD. Cunning-
~a.m, in charge of those in the Levant.
. 90mmander in Chief of all US troops in
the European war theater is Lieutenant
G~ Jacob Devers. In one respect
the abeence of clarity and co-ordination
.. ItiiIl evident: as yet n9 Allied com-
........ in chief for the Europe.an war
. ... ,b1.Mm a,pointed.
JL&ftD '1'UBl'i9~
The many con1licting vie"". about the
strategy to be employed in the Pacifio
were re1leoted in the ohanges in th~ com-
mand of this area, changes which present
the picture of an amazing chaos.
. As we have said before, Churchill and
Roosevelt agreed on January 3, 1942, on
a Supreme Command in the southwestern
Pacific, with Sir Archibald Wavell as its
head. Simultaneously, Admiral Thomas
C. Hart, USN, was appointed Commander
in Chief of the Allied naval forces in that
area. This situation was maintained for
only a few weeks. ViCf?-Admiral Helfrich,
since 1940 Commander in Chief of the
Dutch naval forces in the Netherland
East Indies, took Admiral Hart's place
on February 10, since the latter was
killed in action during the battle of the
Java Sea on February 4. But Vice-
Admiral Helfrich was deprived of a good
deal of Admiral Hart's powers, as the
Americans and British were reluctant to
put their naval forces under the Nether-
lander. Hence it was decided to organize
a new command for the naval forces of
the Australian and New Zealand a·rea
(the "Anzac Area"), to which Vice-
Admiral Herbert F. Leary of the US
Navy was appointed. Even what re-
mained of the southwest Pacific was no
longer under Vice-Admiral Helfrich's full
control; for Washington decreed t.hat
Rear Admiral Glassford, Commander of
the US naval forces in the southwest
Padfic, "would physically direct opera-
tious at sea while Vice-Admiral Helfrich
would direct them from shore," as the
Navy spokesman declared in Washington
on the day Vice-Admiral Helfrich took
over his new post. In addition to this,
there were also Admiral Chester W.
Nimitz, who had been appointed Com-
mander in Chief of the US Pacific Fleet
following the dismissal of Admiral Kimmel
after the disaster of Pearl Hal'bor, and
Rear Admiral John F. Shafroth, since
Mav 22 Commander of the US Fleet in
theW southeast Pacific.
Nor was General Wavell in full control.
Washington explained that his authority
was limited to tactical decisions, while
al1stra.tegical plana were to be elaborated
in London and Washington. "Two com-
mittees above Wavell!" the Batavia news-
paper Javabode wrote in despair on
Februa.ry 9, 1942. General Wavell did
not enjoy his command very long. On
March 2, when the fate of the Netherland
East Indies was sealed, he was returned
to India and replaced by a Dutch general.
The latter lasted only a few days, until
the Dutch forces capitulated, and on
March 17 General MacArthur took his
place.
THREE COIDIITTEES
Finally, numerous committees were .to
spring up in London and Washington to
make the life of the commanders on the
spot miserable and to prevent clarity of
purpose and action.
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On January 27, 1942, iu a speech
before the House of Commons after his
return from the First Washington Meet-
ing, Churehill announced the creation of
"Pacific War Councils" in London and
Washington as well as the formation of
a "Combined Chiefs of Staffs Committee"
in Washington.
The Pacific War Council in London
conaisted of representatives from the
United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand,
India, and the Netherland East Indies
(but not from Chungking). It was to
deal with the entire Pacific situation and
to be assisted by the British Chiefs of
Staffs Committee in London. It met for
the first time on February 10, 1942, with
Prime Minister Churchill in the chair.
The Pacific War Council in Washington,
which met for the first time on April 1
with President Roosevelt in the chair,
bad a larger membership. While also
including representatives from the United
Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and
the Dutch Eut Indies, it lacked a rep-
resentative from India but had rep-
resentatives from Chungking and Canada.
Karry Hopkins, Roosevelt's closest per-
sonal adviser, participated in the Council
Uolt a member of the ''Munitions Assign-
ment Board"-another invention of the
Allied war bureaucracy. The first meet-
ing of the Pacific War Council in Washing-
ton, luting ninety minutes, was widely
publicized; newsreel and neW8 photog-
raphers took pictures.
The Combined Chiefs of Staffs Com-
mittee met in Washington for its first
ee88ion on February 14, 1942. It included
the American Secretaries of the Army and
the Navy and the Chiefs of the US Army,
Nul', and Army Air Force, &8 well &8
Bome ranking British military and naval
repreaentative8. From the outset this
committee was faced by criticism on the
part of the Dominions, the Dutch East
Indies, and China. They were disap-
pointed at not being included and felt
apprehension at the fact that. as a result,
~he 8upr'f'me l!Itrategy of the war was
excluaively in American and English
banda. To allay the8e fears, a represent-
ative of the Australian Army was ad-
mitted to the committee and left for
America on April I.
The relationship between the Pacific
War Councils in London ami Washington
and the Combined Chiefs of Staffs Com-
mittee in Washington remained entirely
unclear, except for a statement in the
New York Time8 on April I, according to
which the Pacific War Council in Wash-
ington was to dominate the one in London,
which latter was to act "as a kind of
liaison office between Washington and
London." The chaos reRulting from 8uch
top-heavy bureaucracy had its share in
bringing about the long series of Japanese
successcs in the Pacific. It seems to us
noteworthy that in none of these three
Allied strategic committees are there any
representativcs of the USSR to be found.
During the past months, less has been
heard of thcse various organizations. As
time went on, it proved necessary to give
more authority to the men on the 8pot
and to curtail the power of the Councils
and Committees in faraway London and
Washington. As far as the southwestern
Pacific is concerned, these men on the
spot were primarily MacArthur, Nimitz,
and Halsey.
"MACNTMSEY"
On March 17, General DouglL\.8 Mao-
Arthur, the Commander in Chief of the
American and Filipino forces in the
Philippine Islands, left Corregidor by
plane prior to its capture by the Japanese
and was appointed Commander in Chief
of the Allied forces in those portions of
the southwestern Pacific which were still
in Allied handa, i.e., primarily Australia.
He was severely handicapped in his
duties by the fact that the Allied naval
forces in the 80uthwestern Pacifio were
under the independent command, first of
Vice-Admiral Leary, then of Vioe-Admiral
Robert Lee Ghormley and, on October
26, 1942, after his recall owing to his
failures in the Solomon Ia1aDda, of Vice-
Admiral William Ha1aey. Viee-Admiral
Halsey in turn had to consider the wishes
of Admiral Chester V. Nimitz, the lupreme
commander of the Allied naval foroee in
the entire Pacific with the exception of
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1be United States West Coast and Alaska.
Thus, although Vice-Admiral Halsey had
the "tactical cODUDlUld," the "strategic
command" was in the hands of Admiral
Nimitz.
The Australian press invented the
name "KacNimsey" from syllables taken
from each of these three namcs. But
even this compound name could not
conceal the difficulties arising from so
complex a leadership. In the middle of
last April, MacArthur' and Halsey met
for several days to clarify the issue of
command. Almost a whole month pnssed
before. on May 1", 1943, news of this
meeting was published. The reports
I8emed to indicate that MacArthur had
won and that henceforth his command
was to supersede t.hat of Halsey. How-
ever, the statements were so oonfused
that the clamor for a unifie<1 command
in the south and southwest Pacifio has
not ceased.
While aU this was going on in the
. Allied camp, the Japanese rapidly devel-
oped the far-flung arc of their outer
defell8C8 in which they had established
themselves in the spring of 1942. It
I'UD8 from Burma through Malai, Sumatra,
J>j....a~ Timor, New Guinea, and the
BiIaIw'ek Arobipelap to the Marshall
Wands and Ohto:ri Shima (formerly
known as Wake IalaDd). No wOllder
that the "Europe Fint" strategy found
ita most severe critics in AU8tralia and
Chungking. Their reaction thron much
light on the strategy of the Allies.
AUSTRALIA AND "EUROPE FIBST"
When it became clear that Churchill
and Rooeevelt were pursuing a ..Europe
First" policy, Australia reacted immedi-
ately with signs of disappointment and
pleas for reconsideration. It is easy to
imagine how Australians must feel when
Japanese planes fly over their territory
while they are reading books like Victory
81rtJttgy. This book was written by
America's outstanding military oommen-
tator, H&D80n Baldwin of the NftD York
Timu, and appeared in April- 1M2.
After explaining that Hawaii, Alasb.,
7
and the Aleutian lalandB must, of courae,
be kept intact, he continues:
But when it comes to the queetion of Auatralia,
and only Auatralia, I would place hor in the cate·
gory of 8000ndary importance in the strategic
1IeIllIe. Australi. to Allia is 88 w68tem Africa to
Europe. In other words her strategic impon..nce
is much ,_ th." that which is attached to Ule
British Islea, Hawaii. Midway, A1aIIka. the AJeu·
tians, India. the So,·iet Union. or ChungkiDtl. H
I am permitted to eay so frankJ.". I would rather
givo up AUAtralia • . • . The fact that Auat.ralia
has dclaerta both in the north and in the IIOUth,
which virtuall)' cut off comrnunicatioq with the
interior, makelI her defenae 80 difficult &8 to demand
tho nood of an enormous quantity of shipping.
Books could be filled with quotations
from the Australian press and radio,
showing how the Australians have been
trying to influence London and Washing-
ton ever since that first blow of Colonel
Knox's "Hitler First" statement in Jan-
uary 1942; and there is no end to the
cartoolU! repeating ideas similar to the
one expressed in a cartoon of the 8ydmy
Daily Telegraph (23.3.43): Ridiculing
Churchill's broadcast of March 21 ("some
time next year-it may well be the year
after-we might beat German)'''), the
cartoon shows a gigantic Japanese soldier,
standing with one foot in China and the
other in New Guinea, while a tiny AU8-
tralian shakes his fist at him saying,
"You just wait (till year after year after
next)!"
m:. "BOLDING WARto
It was this same Churchill broadcast
which 6nalIy proved to Australia the
futility of her attempts to ehange Chur-
chill's mind. At first the reaction W&8
almost one of despair. It was impossible
to conceal the disappointment and alarm.
But at the same time the Australian
leaders realized that they could not allow
their people to remain in this gloomy
and perplexed state of mind. and they
began to 8C&rch for some formula which
would make the situation more under-
standable to the AU8tralians. 80 they
invented a new slogan-the "holding
war." In a speech made on March 25,
Prime Minister Curtin gave to understand
that hope of diverting Churchill and
Rooeevelt from the "Hitler First" polioy
had to be abandoned, and added: "Wheth-
er we J.ib it or not, we shall 688&Y a
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'holding war' against Japan for some
indefmite period. This period has every
indication of being protracted." A week
later, in an address at a Liberty Loan
rally, he stated :
"Auatraliana must realize tbat they face a long
IItrugle-a IItruggle tbat must lu.. longer than
tbe IItrugle in Burope. Tbe augmenta"ion of
rorcee in tbe Pacific, necell8lU"Y for a defeat of
Japan. cannot come before Hitler's dereat. Aus-
tralia it facing a prolonged war without inter-
ruption, week by week, month by montb, for "11'0,
tbree, or more years. I put it before tbe Austral·
lana 1lO.lemnly and pitil-ty "bat it requires the
whole IItreagtb of the Alliea to defeat Hitler. The
1_ concentration of Allied fol'OO8 ..hero iJI in
Europe tbe longer the war will Jaat. All 11'0 can
do it to hold on with all our strength. whatever
the lIOCri6ce. II in the meantime and prior t.o
HitJer's defeat. Australia should go down, t.he war
would be lItill more prolonged bee-AU8Il it would
depriv~ tbe United Nations of any baee whererrom
to wage war agaillllt Japan."
A NEW LINE
From then on the Australian Govern-
ment changed its policy in London and
Washington. Resigning itself to the im-
po88ibility of altering the "Europe First"
decision, it adopted a new line. "We
realize that you are not going to send us
armies or navies for the time being, 80
we do not ask for that any more," it
said in effect to Roosevelt and Churchill.
"But if you want U8 to be able to con-
tinue our 'holding war' with the forces
available in Australia, we need one thing
absolutely-more planes."
Bearing messages of this kind, Dr.
Evatt, the Australian Foreign Minister,
Lieutenant General Kenny, Commander
of the Allied Air Force in the southwest
Pacific, and Major General Sutherland,
MaoArtbur's Chief of StaB, were sent to
Waahington. And, to back up their
pleas, a broadside was fired in the direc-
tion of Washington from the three biggest
guns in Australia. On April 14, Prime
Minister Curtin, General MacArthur, and
General Sir Thomas Blamey, Commander
of the Allied land forces in the southwest
Pacific, delivered speeches all to the same
eftect, namely, that the danger of a
Japaneee attack against Australia was
very great, the concentration of Japanese
troops, planes, and ships in the area north
of Awrt.ralia more alarming than at any
time before, and the need for more planes
imperative.
WA8lIINGTON'S ANSWER
Colonel Knox, US Secretary of the
Navy, countered the plea from Australia
with the charge that the speeches of
April 14 had greatly exaggerated the
danger threatening Australia and that,
according to the best information at the
Government's disposal, there was no
indication of any large naval concentra-
tion of the Japanese in the waters north
of Australia.
Colonel Knox's statement, which was
tantamount to calling Curtin, MacArthur,
and Blamey liars, immedia~ly caused a
flare-up. The Australian press rallied
behind its leaders, while in America
public opinion was divided and for the
firtlt time an anti-MacAtthur wave swept
through the press of the USA. Here is
an example, quoted from an editorial in
the Chicago Sun:
[General MacArthur] is caUfting t.be American
public t.o 10llll confidence in t.he joint Chief. of
Stafta. against whe. major .vat.eIio decieioaa he
a~ to be.proteating.••• There is oot.hing in
the coone of eveota to indicate that tM. men
should be deprived of their commands or sub-
jected t~ a hoBtile publicity campaign by a sub-
ordinate. And let MacArthur remember that berore
ho instruct. hie spokesman again t~ contradict
Colonel Knox.
During the last few weeks Prime
Minister Curtin and his supporters made a
number of more hopeful statements, in
the eftort to create the impreesion that
the Third Washington Meeting had finally
shown proper understanding for the needs
of the Pacific war theater. Curtin never
failed to add that this favorable turn
was the result of his own statesmanship.
Since, however, the Australian elections
are probably to be held this autumn, this
sudden optimism would eeem to be noth-
ing but an election maneuver.
The attitude of New Zeal&l)d waa on
the whole similar to that of Australia,
with one difterence, however. Not feel-
ing themselves directly menaced &8 yet
by a Japanese attack, the New Zealanders
have shown a rather provincial compla-
cency toward world politics.
\
•
4LLIEO STRATEGY 9
CHUNGKING
In order to understand Chungking's
feelings toward the strategy of London
and Washington, one must bear in mind
that the Chungking leaders have stood
alone in a serious war lasting almost six
years. When the Pacific war broke out,
Chungking's first reaotion was one of joy
over the fact, that it had now gained two
vaat empires as allies in its struggle
against Japan. It expected that Japan's
pre88ure would be noticeably lessened as
ahe would have to fight Amerioa and Great
Britain, and Chungking even dreamed
that the Allies would orush Japan.
However, the opposite oooUJ'l'ed, and
<JlungkiDg quickly found itself infinitely
worse off than before the outbreak of the
Paciflo war. Instead of finding relief
through the aotive entry of the Anglo-
Americans into the war, Chungking had
to send its own troops to &88ist them in
Burma, with the result that its divisions
there were al80 drawn into the vortex of
the British defeat. And this was not all.
Before the PlWific war, Chungking had
received supplies from the Anglo-Saxon
countries via Burma and southeastern
China. The Japanese conqut'st of
Hongkong and Burma completely
cloeed these doors, leaving only the
air route from India to Chungking
open.
At first Chungking tried to console
itself with the thought that this adverso
development was only temporary, that
the Allies would soon recover from their
blows and hit back at Japan. Instead,
the heaviest blow of all came: the real-
ization that the Allies were determined
on a "Europe First" policy. When it
WIUJ fiJ'At formulated by Colonel Knox a
few weeks after the outbreak of the
Pacific war, Chungking immediately pro-
teeted. On January 18, Dr. Sun Fo,
President of the Legislative Yuan, de-
clared at a press interview :
I'U Britain and tbe United Statee intend allowing
Japan & free huld in EAst Asia, 811 advocated in
I'8OflIlfl 8f*'Cl'- made by leading Anglo.Am~rican
Mt.emIoD. with • ,,·jew to finiahing the fight in
Europe tint, JI'l've doubta eXUlt in our minds lIS
to Uae adviBabillty of our contin~ to resist
Japan."
SECOND ORPHAN
Still Chungking hoped that the words
of Colonel Knox had expl'e88ed the
opinion of one man only. The faked
reports about the American air raid on
Japan created the illusion that America
had finally started her offensive. But
whcn no further raids followed, and 'the
first raid was gradually reduced to its
true proportions, inoreased gloom de-
scended on Chungking, until the Caeablan-
ca Conference left no doubt that the
"Europe First" policy had won out.
The lack of spirit with which the Burma
campaign along the Arakan COB.8t was
carried out by the British forces between
December 1942 and April 1943 and its
disastrous end confirmed to Chungking
its sad isolation.
Chungking's reactiolUl to this ~p-.
pointing development wt're very 81milar
to Australia's. Both are orphans of the
Pacific, and both have used almost
identical arguments and methods in their
desire to reverse the "ElIl'opc First"
decision. They ha\'e even repeatedly
pointed out to the world .the ot~er
orphan's plight, thereby hoping to m-
crease thc Allies' attt>ntion to their own.
Thus, on May G, the Chungking Central
Daily New8 wrote: "The position of
Ausiralia is sel'ious. Australia is Japan's
immediate objective, and the JDenace to
Australia cannot be overlooked. Aus-
tralia's appeal for more help should not
fall on rleaf cars."
Like Australia, Chungking sent its
representatives to plead for aid. Among
them wero Madame Chiang Kai-shek,
General Hshmg Shih-hui, and Foreign
Minister T. V. Sool1g. The plea WaB
always for 8 "third front" and for
material aid through the reopening of
the Burma Road; and no opportunity
wa.~ missed by Chungking to impress the
Allies, particularly America, with the
disastrous consequences which the absenoo
of aid was bound to bring.
SURPRISES
In view of the constant repetition of
this demand, it was a slap similar to
that given to Australia by Colonel Knox
in April when President Roosevelt, in his
The development of the war up till
now hll8 shown that the Allies have
not Ix.>en strong enough and did not
p088C88 enough ships to conduct large-
scale operations against both Europe and
East Asia. Whether they ever will be
strong enough for this is more than
doubtful. America's milita.ry strength,
it is true, is still on the increase, although
the rate of increase is declining; but that
speech opening the new session of Con-
gross, declared on January 7, 1943: "The
United States is sending Chungking by
air as much material as she was sending
when the Burma Road was open."
Chungking's comment on this statement
was "surprising" and "amazing." But
88 .tho truth could be disclosed only by
publishing hitherto carefully guarded se-
crete, there was nothing Chungking could
do about it.
Roosevelt's statement did not stop
Chungking's clamor for more. aid.
Nevertheless, approximately at the same
time as Australia, Chungking also began
to show signs of resigning itself to tho
"holding war." But, like Australia,
it d,id not abandon its incessant demands
for more planes. Even in this modest
hope, however, Chungking has 80 far
bee~ disappointed. In March 1943, at a
New York meeting in honor of Madame
ChittPg Kai-shek, General H. Arnold,Com~andcr in Chief of the US Army
Air Force, explained America's inability
to satisfy Chungking's desire for planes for
the time being. He gave many reasons
and pointed out that, to maintain 400
bombers and 100 fighters in air bases in
China, 75,000 tons of gasoline a month
88 well lUI large amounts of bombs and
arms would be nece88ary. In order to
8upply by air this amount of gasoline
alone, General Arnold explained, more
than 1,000 four-engincd large-sized trans-
porte would have to be operated more
than 12 times a month.
The fact that, in the fint half of 1943,
seven Chungking generals have gone over
with their troops to the National Govem-
ment, is a sympton of the reaction of the
Chungking adherents to the policy of their
allies.
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of Great Britain seems to have reached
itB zenith some time ago, while both
Germany and Japan are adding to their
strength every month. Japan, in fact,
has only started to mobilizc the huge
resources of her nc\\" empire.
Thus the Allies still have to choose
between "Europe First" and "Japa."l
First". Neither choice is attractive -.10
them. If they concentrate on Europe,
they allow Japan to consolidate her
power still further, and vice versa.
Hitherto the Allies have clearly followed
a "Europe First" policy. This, we be-
lieve, was the result of pres!'iure coming
from London and Moscow and of the
fear that an all-out war against Japan
wouJd give Germany a free hand in
Europe and might C&WJe the USSR (or
even England) to drop out of the war.
To keep the Red Army in the war is of
paramount importance to Roosevelt and
Churchill. In fact, Allied strategy 80 far
can almost be reduced to the formuJa:
do everything to let the Reds do ninety
per cent of the fighting.
If Roosevelt saw himself compelled in
this respect to follow a policy not al-
together popuJar in his country, ono
need not ft-'CI too sorry fo.· him. He
knows how to look after his interests.
Thus the "Europe First" strategy h38
resulted in his growing influence in Aus-
tralia and in the establishment of what
practically amouutB to an American pro-
tectorato over large parts of Africa.
Surveying the chaotic story of Allied
strategy in the first eighteen months
since Pearl Harbor, one ca.nnot but
notice the contrast oft'ered by the strategy
of the Axis. TWa strategy is clear and
convincing. For the Axis, no such pe'J'.
plexing alternativC8 cxist as "Europe
First" or "Pacific First". Wllile Japan is
building Greater East Asia, Germany and
Italy are consolidating Greater Europe.
Each 8uccess of one Axis partner auto-
matically benefit8 the others, as both
ends of the Axis arc not only fighting
agai~ the intrusion of Great Britain and
the USA into their spheres but are also
preparing for the decisive counterattaCk
against the Allies. .
